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The struggle for political hegemony in early modern Europe was not solely pursued by military 
means. The many layered antagonistic claims – often motivated by religious and political 
ambitions, within Europe and beyond its borders – lead to a variety of theories which aimed to 
foster claims for political influence and hegemony. Universal monarchy and balance of power are 
the two main concepts which can be discerned as the principal strategies employed in the strife, if 
not for Empire, at least for hegemony. The study of religion and Empire is closely related to the 
claims to universal monarchy, as it was this concept which not only claimed legitimate dominion 
over the world, but in doing so, commanding the role of purveyor of order and peace. Catholicism 
was used to re-enforce the claim to empire. However, during the process of state building in the late 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, universal monarchy was increasingly challenged and 
eventually superseded by the alternative idea of a balance of power, as a means of organising the 
emerging European state system.
1
 Indeed, among most political thinkers of the seventeenth century 
the idea of universal monarchy had lost its constructive political value and was mostly used 
polemically.
2
 Theories which attempted to found interstate relations and peace in Europe upon the 
concepts of universal monarchy or the universal supremacy of the Catholic Church played a minor 
part in international political thought. Instead the idea of a balance of power as the best means to 
organise the European state system gained traction among political thinkers in this period.
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The aim of this essay is to contrast these two concepts in way of a brief case study by looking at 
Tommaso Campanella's A Discourse Touching the Spanish Monarchy: Laying Down Directions 
and Practices Whereby the King of Spain May Attain to an Universal Monarchy first composed in 
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 Hume famously argued that already the ancient Greeks organised their inter-state relations by using a balance of 
power by all but its name. D. Hume, “Of the balance of power”, in D. Hume, Political Essays, ed. by K. Haakonssen 
(Cambridge 1994), p. 154. See also J. Robertson, “Universal Monarchy and the Liberties of Europe: David Hume's 
Critique of an English Whig Doctrine” in Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain, ed. by T. Phillipson/Q. 
Skinner (Cambridge 1993), p. 349-373. 
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 See A. Strohmeyer, “Ideas of Peace in Early Modern Models of International Order: Universal Monarchy and 
Balance of Power in Comparison” in J. Dülffer/R. Frank (eds.), Peace, War and Gender from Antiquity to the 
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 See B. Arcidiacono, Cinq Types de Paix. Une Histoire des Plans de Pacification perpétuelle (Paris 2011), p. 75-112 
and the brief overview in M. van Gelderen, “Universal Monarchy, the Rights of War and Peace and the Balance of 
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Latin around 1600 and published in English in 1654. Campanella's (1568-1639) is one of the most 
accomplished and far reaching accounts of universal monarchy in the early seventeenth century.
4
 
He draws as much on Botero's reason of state arguments, as on Dante and the idea of a Catholic 
universal Church. I will contrast Campanella's proposal with the Grand Design by the Duke of 
Sully (1559-1641). What Sully puts forward in his Memoirs is a plan for how best to conduct 
French foreign policies with the aim of forming an alliance against the Habsburgs.
5
 Dynastic and 
confessional allegiances remained to play their part in the ensuing European state system, as can be 
seen in Sully’s proposal. However, the Westphalian settlement of 1648 was multi-polar and power 
relations were increasingly complex. This was reflected in Samuel Pufendorf’s work and a brief 
outlook at Pufendorf will highlight how political thought developed further in the attempt to 
understand and organise the increasingly complex European state system. 
 
I Universal Monarchy - Campanella’s international thought 
The relationship between papacy and empire was the central subject of political debate in the later 
Middle Ages and Dante succinctly summarised the debate in the three books of his Monarchy. 
Dante is a staunch advocate of universal monarchy, and argued that “it was by right, and not by 
usurping, that the Roman people took on the office of the monarch (which is called empire) over all 
man”.6 In the third book he discussed the well-trodden question of the relationship between the 
papacy and the emperor and firmly sided with the imperial camp: “the (...) imperial authority 
derives directly from (...) God. (...) the authority of the church is not the cause of imperial 
authority”.7 Campanella refers repeatedly to Dante and his views on imperial power. In contrast to 
Dante, Campanella suggested that the King of Spain ought to make use of the Catholic faith so that 
“the Kingdom of Spain may be the more firmly incorporated into the Church, by having both 
Cardinals, and Popes themselves always true to their [Spain's] Faction”.8 The Catholic Church is 
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thus to be used in support of Spanish universal monarchy. Indeed, according to Campanella, “it is 
not sufficient that we have the Clergy on our side; but we are further to labour that at length we may 
get a Spaniard to be elected Pope, or rather, one of the house of Austria”.9  
Campanella's aspirations do not end there. Just as Alexander the Great or Julius Cesar had used 
legislation on religious matters for their own political ends, the Spanish King should also “make a 
Law, to be observed by all Christians; (...) that whensoever any People or Country shall forsake the 
Roman Religion, all Princes shall be bound, upon pain of forfeiting their Estates, to root out, and 
extirpate the same”.10 Dynastic and religious politics should go hand in hand in order to achieve the 
ambitious objective of universal monarchy. All means necessary ought to be employed in this 
endeavour. Thus ultimately the Spanish King would also be in a position to defend and promote the 
Catholic faith. Campanella leaves no doubt that for him, Catholicism and universality are aspects of 
the same enterprise. Therefore, the Spanish Monarch must promote the Catholic faith within Europe 
against the heretical Protestants, at the frontiers of Europe against the infidel Turks
11
 and beyond 
the frontiers of the known world towards the New World.
12
 Catholicism simultaneously reinforces 
the Spanish claim to universal monarchy and, if the Spanish were to succeed in attaining this claim, 
it would profit. The Spanish King would not only rule over the world, but he would also be 
“dignified with the Title of the Catholick or Universal King”, which according to Campanella 
shows “plainly, that this is the will of the Holy Spirit”.13 Interestingly Campanella avoided 
discussion of the fact that the Spanish monarchy was a composite monarchy, thus suggesting 
uniformity where it could only be identified in the plurality of a composite structure.
14
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 T. Campanella, A Discourse, p. 25. In his concept of universal monarchy Dante had separated imperial and church 
authority as these were in his view the main reasons for the antagonistic factions within Italy at the time of his 
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Church for the Spanish project of universal monarchy. In any case it should be noted that “the universal Empire had 
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 T. Campanella, A Discourse, p. 46. 
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 T. Campanella, A Discourse, p. 22: “He [the King of Spain] is the Chief Defender of Christian Religion, (...); calling 
together also the Christian Princes, to consult about the recovery of those Countreys they have lost, and are at this 
day in the hands of Hereticks, and Turks”. 
12
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 T. Campanella, A Discourse, p. 25. Despite Campanella’s emphasis on strengthening the power of the Spanish king, 
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 See J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469-1716 (London 1976),  p. 167f.; H. Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire. The 
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The rise of Spain also inherently explains her decline, as the wheel of fortune is unreliable and 
subject to constant change. “There was an Occasion (...) offered to Charles the V. who (...) might 
have been able to have made himself Lord of the whole Earth”15, but he failed to seize the chance 
fortuna offered. This is a familiar argument in Machiavelli's Principe.
16
 According to Campanella, 
this failure occurred, fundamentally, because the Spanish rulers neglected to take possession of their 
conquests in the way Machiavelli had called for in chapter three of his Principe.
17
 The fundamental 
strategic mistake of the Spanish monarchy was her misguided policy and constant conflict in the 
Low Countries, which was the principle reason for the decline of Spain.
18
 
Although Charles V and Philip II failed to achieve universal monarchy, the Spanish dominions, 
certainly provided formidable foundations for universal monarchy. This was the gist of 
Campanella's writing, in his claim that “the Universal Monarchy of the world (...) is at length come 
down to the Spaniard”.19 Given this brief sketch of Campanella's vision for Spanish monarchy, his 
model could hardly claim to be an acceptable attempt to pacify warring Europe.
20
 Universal 
monarchy had to be achieved against the resistance and claims of other powers both within and 
outside of Europe. The time had clearly passed for the assertion that peace could be achieved 
through universal monarchy.
21
  Already by the beginning of the seventeenth century, with the 
remarkable exception of Campanella, the concept of universal monarchy had lost any positive 
connotations for leading political thinkers, especially with regards to its ability to provide a stable, 
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II Balance of power – Sully’s challenge of Spanish universal monarchy 
Let us turn to Sully and the Grand Design
23 
in order to compare his argument with that of 
Campanella. The Grand Design is known as the plan of the French King Henry IV, though it is only 
through the writings of the Duke of Sully that we know about this scheme.
24
 The driving force 
behind it, as Sully stated himself, was “the Hatred against Spain, (...) which is the great and 
common Motive by which these Powers [i.e. the monarchies of France, England, Denmark and 
Sweden] are animated. (...), it only remains to examine, by what Means the House of Austria [i.e. 
Habsburg] may be reduced to the sole Monarchy of Spain; and the Monarchy of Spain to Spain 
only. These Means consist either in Address or Force”.25 From the textual evidence of the Memoirs  
the key motive for Sully's plan was to secure French power, which in turn would bring about 
security and peace in Europe. Therefore, the interpretation that he tried to create some kind of 
European federation, inspired by a “European conscience”26, needs to be questioned. These plans 
for a powerful alliance, which would allow the French to match the superior military might of the 
Spanish monarchy, depended, according to Sully, largely on the English crown.  
Campanella on the other hand believed that the largest threat to the Spanish claim to universal 
monarchy would come from France and Henry IV. For Campanella there could be no doubt “that 
there is no Christian Kingdome, that is more able to oppose, and put a stop to the growing of the 
Spanish Monarchy, then France”.27 It was for this reason that Campanella argued that an alliance 
between the French and the English needed to be avoided at all costs. Indeed, using Henry IV's 
conversion to Catholicism
28
, Campanella is able to use religious politics to further his goals of 
Spanish dominance, suggesting that the Pope should be persuaded to “interdict the King of France 
the contracting of any League, or Friendship, either with the Queen of England, or with any other 
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6  
Hereticks”.29 Sully's plans for a French alliance with England were thus, unsurprisingly, perceived 
by the Habsburg camp as the most dangerous threat to their political ambitions and claims. 
It is in this context that James I's succession to the English throne was of the utmost importance, as 
“the Death of Elizabeth (...) gave so violent a Shock to Henry's grand Design, as had like to have 
made him abandon all Hopes of its Success. He nevertheless attempted to remedy the fatal Effects 
apprehended from it, by endeavouring to inspire her successor, King James, with all her Sentiments 
in regard to it. And for this Purpose he resolved to send me Ambassador to the English Court”.30 
Sully relates in great detail the precautions taken in deciding how to proceed so as not to raise the 
suspicions of the newly crowned English King. He stresses that “the principal Object of these 
Instructions [given to Sully by Henry IV for his ambassadorship to England] had always been a 
close Alliance between France and England, against Spain”.31 Again, the contrast with Campanella 
is illuminating here. The latter was writing at a time when Elizabeth was still alive and the 
succession of James to the English throne was still only an event to be anticipated upon the Queen's 
death. Campanella argues that the Spanish should endeavour to sow discord between the English 
and Scots, as well as among the English nobility and between the parliament and the court. He 
claims that “the time now draweth on, that after the death of the said Queen Elizabeth, who is now 
very old, the Kingdom of England must fall into the hand of their Ancient and continual Rivals, the 
Scots”.32 The Spanish monarch should promise the different interested parties in England “(no one 
of them knowing anything what is said to the other) all the possible aids that can be from Spain, for 
the restoring of them to their Inheritances, Legally descending down to them from their Ancestours; 
and undertake to effect this for them, if not as to the whole Kingdome, yet at least to some part of 
it”.33 Campanella stresses over and over again, that the aim ought to be “that the seeds of a 
continual War betwixt England and Scotland will be sown; in so much that neither Kingdome shall 
have any leisure to work any disturbance to the Spanish Affaires”.34 In order to achieve Spanish 
aims, Campanella suggests thwarting French and English plans against Spain. He urges the Spanish 
king to “send privately to King James of Scotland, and promise him, that He [the Spanish king] will 
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assist him to the utmost of his Power in his getting possession of the Kingdome of England, upon 
this condition; viz, that he shall either restore there again the Catholick Religion
35
; (...) or at least, 
that he shall not annoy, or in anyway disturbe the said Spanish Fleet”.36 The competitive courting of 
the English as part of the struggle for hegemony between the French and Habsburgs can be seen in 
Campanella, advocating the Spanish interest, as much as in Sully, advocating the French interest. 
False promises played as large a role in these endeavours as straightforward bribery did. 
Sully's frustration with France's inability to make headway in forming an alliance with the English 
against the Habsburgs under the reign of King James repeatedly comes to the fore in his Memoirs. 
Sully relates, for instance, how he had to find his way through the labyrinth of competing interests 
pursued by the various factions at the English court, which “was full of Suspicion, Mistrust, 
Jealousy, secret and even public Discontent”.37 He does not shy away from employing 
contemporary French prejudices against the English: “It is certain the English hate us; and this 
Hatred is so general and inveterate, that one would almost be tempted to number it among their 
natural Dispositions. It is undoubtedly an Effect of their Arrogance and Pride; for no Nation in 
Europe is more haughty and disdainful, nor more conceited in an Opinion of its superior 
Excellence”.38 According to Sully, in light of such English stubbornness, it is in the French interest 
to achieve a position of independent power and thus avoid the necessity of relying on an ally who 
“if we examine what they call Maxims of State, we shall discover in them only the Laws of Pride 
itself, adopted by Arrogance and Indolence”.39 To be absolutely clear, what he advocates in his 
Memoirs most prominently is not a proposal for some kind of a European federation, but a policy 
which is informed by France's self-interest.
40
 When his ideas are contrasted with those of 
Campanella, this becomes even more evident. 
The Grand Design was part of the diplomatic and political struggle for influence and power. 
England seemed to be in an advantageous position, because she had not yet committed herself 
formally to an alliance in the struggle between the Habsburg branches of Austria and Spain on the 
one hand and France, some German estates (such as the Prince Elector of the Palatinate), and the 
Low Countries on the other. As dynastic alliances still formed an essential part of European 
interstate policy, Sully considers the various marriage projects.
41
 He also makes clear how 
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Barnevelt, one of the leaders of the Dutch revolt against the Spanish,
42
 tried to push him and Henry 
IV into a formal alliance. 
The Spanish were also lobbying strongly for the English to either join an alliance with them or, at 
the very least, grant assurances of their neutrality, as well as the Northern powers and several 
German princes were also seeking English assistance. Sully summarised this situation in 
unambiguous terms: “Upon the whole; it appeared as though all the Princes of Europe considered 
the gaining of England in their Interest, as of the utmost Consequence”.43 This suggests that Sully's 
concerns, as expressed in his writing, were influenced by contemporary diplomatic and political 
manoeuvring and various endeavours to form alliances in interstate politics. The broad underlying 
principle of the Grand Design was the assumption that “peace is the great and common Interest in 
Europe. Its petty Princes ought to be continually employed in preserving it between the greater 
Powers (...) and the greater Powers should force the lesser into it, if necessary, by assisting the weak 
and oppressed”.44 The implication of such a claim was that the Habsburgs threatened peace in 
Europe and were oppressing the smaller states. In order to counter this aggressive Habsburg attitude 
and their alleged claim to universal monarchy, a balance of power had to be established in Europe, 
which would guarantee the peace and security of all European states.  
Sully's employment of the idea of an equilibrium or balance of power is original in many ways –  
though he could have found this idea in Mornay's Discours au Roy Henry III sur les moyens de 
diminuer l'Espagnol.
45
As far as I can see Sully's contribution to the development of the idea of a 
balance of power in Europe has not been noted by those who studied its history.
46
 He uses the 
balance of power as a decisive tool to achieve a new, peaceful European order, which at the same 
time would strengthen the French position: “The Steps taken by the House of Austria to arrive at 
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Universal Monarchy, which evidently appears from the whole Conduct of Charles Quint and his 
Son”, Sully asserts, “have rendered this Severity as just as it is necessary”.47 Political pamphleteers 
increasingly employed the idea of a balance of power to rhetorical ends, especially when it could be 
connected to the looming threat of a universal monarchy.
48
  
The balance of power was thus intended to provide peace and security while at the same time 
advancing France's position of power and influence within this system.
49
 Quite clearly France's self-
styled image as defender of a European equilibrium was much more acceptable to the other 
European powers than French pretensions to hegemony would have been.
50
 But given the power of 
France, the image of balance meant that France was seen to be the counterweight to the Habsburgs 
on the other side of the scale. This aspect was emphasised by the English historian William 
Camden, who asserts in his History of (...) Elizabeth that it was England which could tip the balance 
on either side, depending on which side of the scales she put her weight: “Thus sate she [Queen 
Elizabeth] as an heroical Princess and Umpire betwixt the Spaniards, the French and the Estates; so 
as she might well have used that Saying of her Father, Cui adhaero, praest, that is, The Party to 
which I adhere getteth the upper hand. And true it was which one hath written, that France and 
Spain are as it were the Scales in the Balance of Europe, and England the Tongue or the Holder of 
the Balance”.51 
When Sully relates the negotiations he held with King James in London during his ambassadorship 
he writes that “the King of England (...) described the present political Affairs of Europe: In which, 
he said, it was necessary to preserve an Equilibrium between three of its Powers. (...) of these three 
Powers [the Habsburgs, Bourbons and Stuarts], the House of Austria in Spain, from the Spirit of 
Dominion with which she was possessed, was the only one who sought to make the Balance incline 
in her favour”.52 The Grand Design is thus presented by Sully as part of Henry IV's foreign policy. 
In this respect, Sully's advice and the Grand Design amounted to what was, above all, a piece of 
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propaganda aimed against the dominance of the House of Habsburg. The belief that, following the 
Grand Design, “a universal Cry from all Parts of Christendom would have been raised against the 
House of Austria” is reiterated repeatedly.53 The Habsburg dynasty is thus presented as the only 
obstacle to European peace and security, because its aspirations to universal monarchy undermines 
the equilibrium of the European state system.  
Not surprisingly Campanella – writing in the interest of Spanish universal monarchy – perceived the 
French as the main threat to peace and stability in Europe. He maintained “that He [the Spanish 
King] hath no body to stand to fear of, but only the King of France, and the King of England; 
which two Princes, by reason of being of different Religions, can never agree together”.54 
Campanella's assertion that the different religious confessions of the two crowns would rule out any 
potential alliance between them was a serious miscalculation.
55
 Their political interests were plainly 
not determined by religious allegiance alone. Interestingly, in a rare example, Campanella also 
employs the concept of the balance of power when he considers the French challenge to the Spanish 
position in Italy. Campanella holds that the French “cannot overcome them [the Spanish]: for, in 
this case, the very Princes, and States of Italy, who have to this day alwaies held with the French, 
would go over to the Spaniard: for it is their Design, to keep the balance alwaies so even betwixt 
these two Nations, as that neither of them may preponderate, and bear down the Scales, and so 
make a Prey of the Other”.56 The balance of power is, for him, a political tool employed by the 
Italians. 
Sully is forced to argue for his proposal from a much weaker position and accordingly “the Purport 
of the Design may be perceived (...) to divide Europe equally among a certain Number of Powers, 
in such a Manner, that none of them might have Cause, either of Envy or Fear, from the Possessions 
or Power of others. The Number of them was reduced to Fifteen; and they were of three Kinds: viz. 
six great hereditary Monarchies; five elective Monarchies; and four sovereign Republicks”.57 The 
consistency of his appeals for his plan on the basis of equality, balancing of power and a 
disinterested French politics indicate that he had to argue much more carefully than Campanella, 
who unabashedly argued for the Spanish crown's dominion over the world. But Sully was far less 
neutral in his design than he presents himself to his readers. His proposal to counterbalance 
Habsburg power in Europe and beyond appears to be based on the resulting balance taking the form 
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of a simple bipolar construction. It seemed “difficult for French writers to move beyond a simple 
bipolar image of the balance. Since France clearly was one of the two 'poles', she could seek support 
to balance Spain or Austria, but was unconvincing when she aspired to any more subtle balance 
role”.58 However, the Grand Design tried to address exactly this difficulty. It played an essential 
part in the propaganda efforts to convince the European Protestant powers of France's genuine 
interest in the balance and of her disinterest in a hegemonic position of power. Part of what the 
Grand Design had to achieve was thus to demonstrate that France had no such ambitions and did 
not harbour self-interested desires for a powerful position. As Sully repeatedly claimed: “Among all 
these different Dismemberings, we may observe, that France reserved nothing for itself but the 
Glory of distributing them with Equity. Henry had declared this to be his Intention long before”.59 
To what extent this strategy would be able to convince those invited to join the alliance is difficult 
to assess. However, it is more likely that it displayed “Sully's scarcely disguised intention of 
confirming the primacy of France”.60 Sully tries hard to counteract such an impression by stressing 
the fact “that though England, and the United Provinces, should use their utmost Efforts of which 
they are capable against the House of Austria, unless they were assisted even by the whole Force of 
the French Monarchy, on whom the chief Management of such a War must fall for many Reasons; 
the House of Austria by uniting the Forces of its two Branches, would with ease (...) sustain itself 
against them”.61 When Sully deals with Europe as a whole in order to discuss how to arrange a new 
order in view of the existing different Christian confessions, his proposals remain fairly general and 
superficial. His leading conviction is, however, that Europe should not be divided by confessional 
differences, but by the political interests of the Habsburgs and her allies on the one hand, and the 
counterweight formed around France and her allies on the other. He makes this explicit in a later 
part of the Memoirs, where he again presents the Grand Design in some detail: “Europe”, he asserts 
here, “is divided into two Factions, which are not so justly distinguished by their different 
Religions, because the Catholicks and Protestants are confounded together in almost all Places, as 
they are by their Political Interests”.62 Sully's statements on the subject in the Memoirs are 
contradictory. The argument presented here serves to suggest that Calvinists and Lutherans are 
indeed to be seen on an equal footing with the Catholics.
63
 
From here, Sully quickly moves on to present an outline of his envisaged plan. Despite the fact that 
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Russia, the Armenians and the Greeks are “ranked (...) among the Christian Powers”64, he excludes 
them from any further consideration. Interestingly, he does so on the grounds that the cultural and 
religious differences between them and the European states are too great to consider them as 
potential elements of his proposed European federation. For him these countries “belong to Asia at 
least as much as to Europe. We indeed may almost consider them as a barbarous Country, and place 
them in the same Class with Turkey”.65 This exclusion was fairly conventional in the early 
seventeenth century. Given the centuries long struggle between the Habsburg's and the Ottomans, it 
is hardly surprising that Campanella had also argued against “the Turk [who] endeavours to make 
himself Lord of the whole World (...). He will also at this time already be called, The Universal 
Lord; as the King of Spain is called, The Catholick King: so that these two Princes seem now to 
strive, which of them shall attain to the Universal Monarchy of the Whole World”.66 Campanella 
was much more concerned about the Ottoman Empire than Sully, because it posed a real threat to 
Spanish claims for universal monarchy: “seeing that (...) the Turk stretcheth forth his hand against 
All Men (...); all whom yet he is frequently wont to delude by his Cessations from Armes, and 
Truces, (for He keeps his faith with none of them:) it would be a businisse worth our serious 
consideration, how this Practise of his might be turned against Himself”.67 Campanella argued from 
a geopolitical perspective that the King of Spain should endeavour to form alliances among the 
powers of the middle east against their “common enemies, the Turk's country”.68 Again the struggle 
for empire and religion go hand in hand in this argument, culminating in the claim that Jerusalem 
should be recovered, “which should be reserved for the King of Spain”.69 This military crusade was 
supported by an intellectual offensive, and Campanella advocated that “the King should erect 
certain Schools in all the Principal Cities, wherein the Arabick Tongue should be taught; that so by 
this meanes there may be such among his subjects as shall be able to dispute with the Turks, Moors, 
and Persians, who by the use of that Tongue spread their Mahumetanisme, as We do Christianity, 
by the Latine Tongue”.70 Whereas Campanella stressed the conflict with the Turks, Sully was keen 
to concentrate on the heartland of Europe and the rearrangements he considers necessary for 
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establishing a new lasting order.
71
 
The Grand Design was, therefore, much less aggressive than Campanella's vision of Spanish 
universal monarchy, and one of its key aspects consisted in the project to create a “general Council, 
representing all the States of Europe”.72 This general council is envisaged as a representative body 
of all European states. It should have the competence to moderate and, if necessary, arbitrate 
conflicts within the state system. However, the originality of this project, with an arbiter formed on 
a representative basis, should not be over-emphasised, as it was in many ways simply a 
reformulation of contemporary ideas about the institution of arbitration.
73
 Nevertheless, Sully 
claims that its “Establishment (...) was certainly the happiest Invention that could have been 
conceived”.74 In order to establish this type of representative body of European states, sweeping 
changes of territorial possessions were envisaged, with the establishment of the council signifying 
only the ultimate step and conclusion of these radical alterations of the European map. Sully was 
aware that “to divest the House of Austria of the Empire; and all its Possessions in Germany, Italy 
and all the Low Countries; in a Word, to reduce it to the sole Kingdom of Spain”75 posed a 
fundamental challenge. It was not conceivable that the Habsburg monarchy could be persuaded to 
such revolutionary and disadvantageous measures, even if Sully emphasised that the aim was an 
equilibrium of the European powers, and that therefore the Habsburg branches should remain 
“nevertheless (...) equally powerful with the other Sovereignties of Europe”.76 Sully had no doubt 
himself that such a dramatic change could only be achieved by war. 
War thus represented not the ultima ratio but the necessary means to break Habsburg hegemony. 
Sully is clear from the outset of his Memoirs that conquest is a perfectly acceptable way to acquire 
rights of dominion in the international sphere.
77
 But his assessment of war is at times contradictory, 
as he also asserts that he is “from repeated Experience, convinced, that the Happiness of Mankind 
can never arise from War”.78 Nevertheless, the changes he considered necessary for the 
establishment of the representative body of the European states were a preliminary step which 
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posed the greatest obstacle to the realisation of the Grand Design. Given that at the time of this 
work Europe had already been at war for almost two decades, the prospect of using war to 
reorganise the European state system at the end of the current war may have been seen as much 
more acceptable, as it meant that a new war need not be launched to achieve the goals of the Grand 
Design. War aims, after all, could be formulated in the context of the ongoing war. The constitution 
of the Holy Roman Empire, with its contradictory division of sovereign rights and obligations, 
meant that France would find allies in Germany against the Habsburgs. With the Emperor's edict of 
restitution of 1629
79
 and again, after the Swedish intervention, with the Peace of Prague of 1635, 
the Habsburgs had managed to impose their claims on the German estates.
80
 Sully suggested, 
therefore, that “France would (...) endeavour to gain the neighbouring Princes and States to join 
with them in their Design; especially the Princes of Germany, who were most immediately and 
dangerously menaced with being subjected to the Tyranny of the House of Austria”.81 In the context 
of the period 1629-1635, Sully's suggestion can thus be read as an almost immediate reaction to the 
unfolding scenes of the theatre of the Thirty Years War. These far reaching war aims could become 
more acceptable for the other states at war with the Habsburgs, as the underlying aim was re-
formulated as the establishment of the balance of power, at the price of Habsburg territories and to 
the benefit of the smaller states. 
Both, Sully and Campanella argued that the balance of power and universal monarchy respectively 
were the best means to avoid conflict and to achieve peace in Europe. However, not surprisingly, 
both men foremost pursued the interest of their king. Both concepts were used to advance the 
interest of France and Spain respectively, and both concepts aimed to make these interests more 
palatable to the other European powers within the state system. Not only were the interests of 
France and Spain pitched against each other, but so were also the theoretical arguments which 
underscored them.
82
 However, the concept of interest itself was increasingly analysed by political 
thinkers. This facilitated a more sophisticated and critical analysis of interstate relations. 
 
III Conclusion and outlook: thinking the European state system 
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Writing after the Peace of Westphalia Samuel Pufendorf is the one who deserves recognition for 
advancing the reflection on the theoretical tools of international political thought. Pufendorf argued 
that to conceive of the various competing interests of states within a system of states allowed to 
consider these interests in a different framework.
83
 For him the strict notion of absolute sovereignty 
was applicable neither to the Holy Roman Empire nor to interstate relations. On the former, he 
famously concluded that “the best account we can possibly give of the Present State of Germany, is 
to say, That it comes very near a System of States, in which one Prince or General of the League 
excells the rest of the Confederation”.84 What he effectively argued for was a system-based concept 
of sovereignty which would allow states to enter into agreements without giving up their 
sovereignty entirely. A “system results when several neighbouring states are so connected by 
perpetual alliance that they renounce the intention of exercising some portions of their sovereign 
power, above all those which concern external defence, except with the consent of all, but apart 
from this the liberty and independence of the individual states remain intact”.85 The state is meant to 
understand and pursue the long term interest. Pufendorf distinguishes between the office and the 
person holding the office, which means that “a certain Method of governing” is prescribed to the 
person of the ruler.
86
 Pufendorf thus reformulates the concept of interest, which in his account 
becomes less subjective, because it needs to be perceived within the framework of a system of 
states. In his criticism of the balance of power doctrine the Abbé Saint Pierre developed this 
argument further. We can, therefore, discern an important shift in the way interstate relations are 
discussed in the middle of the seventeenth century. The concepts of universal monarchy and 
balance of power were not sufficiently able to reflect the increasing complexities of European 
interstate relations. 
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